Abstract—The nature of network services has drastically changed in recent years. New demands require new capabilities, forcing the infrastructure to dynamically adapt to new scenarios. Novel network paradigms, such as software-defined networking (SDN) and network functions virtualization (NFV), have appeared to provide flexibility for network management and services. The reliance on software and commoditized hardware of these new paradigms introduce new security threats and, consequently, one of the most desired capabilities is a strengthened security layer when connecting remote premises. On the other hand, traditional cryptographic protocols are based on computational complexity assumptions. They rely on certain mathematical problems (e.g. integer factorization, discrete logarithm or elliptic curve) that cannot be efficiently solved using conventional computing. This general assumption is being revisited because of quantum computing. The creation of a quantum computer would put these protocols at risk and force a general overhaul of network security. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a novel technique for providing synchronized sources of symmetric keys between two separated domains. Its security is based on fundamental laws of quantum physics, which makes impossible to copy the quantum states exchanged between both endpoints. Therefore, if implemented properly, QKD generates highly secure keys, immune to any algorithmic cryptanalysis. This work proposes a node design to provide QKD-enhanced security in end-to-end (E2E) services and analyze the control plane requirements for service provisioning in transport networks. We define and demonstrate the necessary workflows and protocol extensions in different SDN scenarios, integrating the proposed solution into a virtual router providing QKD-enhanced IPsec sessions.

Index Terms—Quantum Key Distribution, Software Defined Networking, MPLS, OpenFlow, NETCONF, Service Automation

I. INTRODUCTION

The network infrastructure is evolving from static, black-boxed and monolithic approaches towards dynamic and open solutions. Traditional services usually require several days (or even weeks) to be established, while new applications and services change their requirements much faster. This evolution, aiming to cope with this dynamicity, is based on the development of different software paradigms, where multiple functions, actions and operations that usually run internally in a network device are abstracted and executed remotely as software processes. One of these novel network paradigms, called software defined networking (SDN) [1], permits decoupling the control plane (control/management protocols and actions) from the data (forwarding) plane. This separation allows to dynamically manage network services and the infrastructure from a logically centralized management entity, called SDN controller. SDN copes with the changing behaviour of new services, increasingly demanding more capacity together with new capabilities, as they are developed and made available in the market. One of the key demands is to have an enhanced security layer at the network level, while keeping the current infrastructure intact. Despite the behaviour of future network services cannot be predicted, it is certain that communication networks will remain the core to support the forthcoming traffic. Therefore, securing this infrastructure is an increasing concern, as critical information travels across an entire infrastructure. Up until now, network security has been achieved with as a series of ad-hoc solutions. Today’s networks are more complex and, especially with SDN, much more configurable. The security risks are correspondingly larger and the security in the network infrastructure must be enhanced.

QKD technologies [2], [3] allow to generate synchronized random bits in two sources that are separated in space, with the additional property that the maximum information leaked out of these sources can be upper bounded i.e.: the random bits can be used as a secret key. The security of the QKD-produced keys is rooted on the physical layer and, therefore, immune to any algorithmic cryptanalysis. QKD is a new opportunity for operators and infrastructure providers as it can bring an additional physical layer for securing control and data communications. Authors in [4] demonstrated how QKD is a suitable technology for securing control plane channels by combining existing key exchange algorithms together with quantum-generated keys in a hybrid cryptosystem. In this work, we propose and demonstrate an scenario of combining QKD systems to secure end-to-end (E2E) services between remote premises. This paper extends the work done in [5] where authors presented a proof of concept for keys synchronization using a control plane emulation (OSPF, RSVP and PCEP). The creation of connections using this approach is called Quantum Encryption (QE) service. Here, we define, implement and experimentally validate the QE service to operate with Multi-Protocol Label Switching -MPLS- [6], OpenFlow [1] and NETCONF [7]. The dynamic creation of
the QKD key synchronization operations together with the E2E encrypted services is a key requirement for operators to deploy these services in production networks. Current service creation process (manually operated) does not meet the operators needs for next generation networks. To the best of the authors knowledge, this is the first work that demonstrates the control plane configuration as well as the data plane setup by instantiating two virtual network functions (VNFs) that connect two remote virtual networks via QE service.

This work is organized as follows: Section II provides an overview about current QKD technologies and networks, outlining the main benefits, challenges and restrictions; Section III defines the virtual router structure, explaining which software components and interfaces are used to provide the desired encryption capabilities; Section IV describes the proposed workflows for each protocol; Section V explains the required extensions to make every workflow operation possible; Section VI exposes the platform and the design of the testing scenario; Section VII presents the results and captures of the control plane traffic for each protocol and the traffic of the final service; and Section VIII finally concludes the work.

II. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS

Quantum key distribution (QKD) [3] is a technology that allows the growing of a symmetric key shared among the two endpoints of a quantum channel. A quantum channel is the physical media used to transmit the quantum signals -qubits-. In our case it is the optical fiber. QKD also requires the existence of a public but authenticated classical channel that is used to distill the secret key out of the raw detections of quantum signals. An initially small secret is assumed to be shared among the two legitimate users in order to authenticate themselves during the first communication. This is a short-lived secret since afterwards the new communications rounds can be authenticated using the QKD-produced keys. QKD keys have the distinct advantage that they are not algorithmically correlated in any sense thus keys obtained in different rounds have no relation among them, and forward and backward secrecy is guaranteed: an attacker that by some means obtains one of the keys will be unable to derive any other. Under reasonable assumptions -e.g. that no eavesdropper sits inside the QKD device, that the protocols are executed correctly and that the physical implementation is also correct- it can be demonstrated to be absolutely secure. This means that the amount of information on the secret key leaked outside the systems is bounded and that the bound can be made arbitrarily small. In another words, QKD is an Information Theoretical Secure (ITS) Primitive. It is to be noted that the ITS character is not necessarily inherited by the rest of the cryptographic chain and that it depends on the methods used after the QKD primitive have been used. For example, if AES is used to cypher messages instead of a one-time pad, the result will not be ITS, no matter if the keys used came from a QKD process or not.

This is in contrast with conventional cryptography, where the secrecy is based on algorithmic complexity assumptions. These assumptions are not demonstrated and its security is just based on the belief that nobody has been or will be able to solve the mathematical problem, that guards the security of the secret, within its desired life-time. Forward and backward security is also not guaranteed, since secrets are algorithmically related and their security is built upon the assumptions that the mathematical problems cannot be broken using the computational resources available.

Although this is the de-facto and well established way of working that has served us well, the existence of algorithms breaking the mathematical problems underlying the security of RSA, Diffie-Hellman or Elliptic Curve Cryptography, cannot be ruled out. In fact, it is the advent of quantum computers and Shor’s algorithm what has triggered the obsolescence process of these algorithms recommended by the US National Security Agency [8] and the flurry of research activity in new algorithms.

On the other hand, algorithmic complexity based cryptographic protocols have the advantage of not being limited by a physical implementation. QKD is intrinsically distance-limited because qubits have a non-zero probability to interact with the transport medium. Any signal propagating in a medium suffers an exponential attenuation, being critical when the signals are composed of a single quantum. Also, the interactions with the environment are indistinguishable from the action of a spy and errors must be treated as if they were the action of an eavesdropper, thus heavily penalising the secret key throughput. As a typical example, in the case of qubits and optical fiber, losses are about 0.2 dB per km when the qubits are encoded in photons at 1550 nm. QKD systems working with maximum losses of about 30 dB have been demonstrated and technology is reaching maturity quickly. This means that today’s practical limit in distance -not taking into account one of a kind laboratory efforts- is about 150 km. Going to this distance also means a strongly reduced secret key rate output. Top performance figures are about 1Mbit of final secret key at 40 km distance in direct links, without crossing any passive network equipment that would increase losses. Other options, better suited for network usage, are also being demonstrated. Also, quantum repeaters [9] can be potentially built, but this requires technology that may be years in the future.

QKD technologies have been demonstrated in metropolitan area, in networks of exclusive use for the quantum part, that run in parallel with the telecommunications network [10], [11] and also exploring the capability to run in an integrated way with conventional telecommunications networks [12], [13]. The former ones emphasized the usage of different QKD implementations working in a trusted node1 regime to allow key distribution and forwarding among any node within the QKD network (and also to logically connect physically incompatible devices). Within a trusted node, ITS mechanisms (e.g. a simple XOR among the QKD keys generated pairwise between directly connected nodes) can be used to forward the keys and traverse the network to securely connect two remote locations. The later ones emphasized direct switched connections using as many off-the-shelf optical components as

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1System assumed to be protected under a security perimeter. This system can be composed by multiple subsystems or devices (e.g. a host computer or a QKD endpoint).
possible. It is the optical infrastructure of this later type [13] what we have used in the present paper. In the last years, a surge of interest in the technology has drawn the attention of several companies and the availability of QKD devices from different sources -an important issue in the security market- seems larger and more promising than ever.

While the distance limit might currently seem an insurmountable one, in practice this is not such a problem in metropolitan areas working with modern network paradigms [14]. From a security point of view, SDN and NFV designs mandate that network controllers and virtualized network functions run in a protected environment. Thus, the important figure here is the distance that separates the security perimeters protecting the points of presence -trusted nodes- where the controllers and VNFs are running. In a metropolitan area, these are within present day QKD limitations and, thus, QKD is a realistic technology in which to base a physical security layer to protect the infrastructure and network services. From a logical point of view, the QKD links can be seen as devices that extend the security perimeter of the points of presence to the optical fiber connecting them, thus making possible to securely share keys among any connected node.

III. VIRTUAL ROUTER DESIGN

Network functions virtualization (NFV) [15], [16] paradigm is also at its peak in terms of development and technological advances for next generation networks. It uses concepts from traditional computing virtualization to encapsulate functionalities from network devices into software instances. It allows to dynamically allocate functions (such as firewalls, switches, routers, deep packet inspectors, etc.) in distributed environments reducing time and costs in deploying new infrastructures. In this work, we propose the integration of basic routing functions, together with IPsec point-to-point sessions using QKD-generated keys, all automated via standard protocols. Fig. 1 shows an example of the high-level structure of the VNF design. It is divided in northbound, southbound interfaces and core (forwarding):

- As a northbound interface (NBI), our solution provides two different points of access: a management interface to the NFV control framework and a second one connected to the network controller (path computation element – PCE– [17], SDN controller or NETCONF manager). The first interface receives commands in order to control the lifecycle of the VNF, as well as to provide connectivity to the system itself. The second one allows remote control for network service management and automation via network (SDN) controller.
- In the core of the node, we control the traffic from/to our private network using “ip route” and “iptables” rules. For setting up IPsec sessions, we use an extension of the ipsectools code to inject the keys extracted from the QKD systems via PFKEY key management API [18].
- As a southbound interfaces (SBI), the virtual node connects to the QKD systems using an interface based on [19]. This interface allows the node to specify a QoS for the key session, and provides a unique session ID for key extraction.

This virtual node is also composed by east-west (internal-external) interfaces for packet forwarding in the data plane. Upon deployment, the node runs the agent in charge of communicating with the controller, for further configuration of its core functionalities (forwarding and secure sessions) when required.

IV. PROPOSED WORKFLOWS

As described in [5], the main operations in any workflow for setting up a Quantum Encryption –QE– E2E service are: capabilities dissemination, key synchronization and device (service) configuration. Although any protocol must take care of the same set of actions and finally deploy a similar configuration, the different protocols fundamentally differ in the way these actions are performed, as they were defined for different purposes and use various collections of messages for their operations. Fig. 2 shows a high-level example of the main control plane instances and interactions among the entities involved using the considered protocols. In this figure, we can see two nodes (QE nodes) that have the capability of encrypting the traffic using QKD generated keys, an intermediate network (cloud) and a network controller. It is important to note that any workflow could be initiated either via the controller’s NBI or from the network device itself. This work mainly focuses on the service deployment (key synchronization), while the capabilities dissemination is demonstrated as a proof of concept by sharing basic information (flags) between device and controller. The main information to be transmitted is as shown in table I, while the workflow description associated to each protocol and the main differences among them, are as
TABLE I
PARAMETERS TO BE EXCHANGED BETWEEN DEVICE AND CONTROLLER FOR THE QE-SERVICE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KeyID (Key handle)</td>
<td>An identifier used to synchronize QKD key sessions in separated endpoints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key length</td>
<td>Length of the key used to encrypt the current channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destination</td>
<td>Other endpoint (remote peer) of the encrypted channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Ingress node of the channel (only used in the request to the controller). For node configuration, destination (remote peer) is used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encryption layer</td>
<td>Layer in which the traffic is encrypted (e.g. Ethernet, IP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encryption algorithm</td>
<td>A value to specify the symmetric encryption algorithm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refresh type</td>
<td>This value identifies the type of refresh considered to update the key (e.g., time, length)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refresh value</td>
<td>This value specifies the amount considered for a given type used to refresh a key</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

follows. An important issue in deploying VNFs is the mutual authentication problem. In this work we do not deal explicitly with this problem, but point out that it can be tackled in several ways. One possibility, that we have used in several tests, is to use the same toolkit that we integrated for the encryption (ipsectools) and create new authentication rules for the IPsec session (using, as an example, AH and hmac-md5) with keys extracted from the QKD link.

A. MPLS protocol suite

Fig. 3 shows the workflow for synchronizing a QKD key and setting up a QE service between two endpoints. Initially, both nodes must expose their capabilities to the PCE via interior gateway protocol (IGP). Regardless of whether the request is initiated by an active PCE, a northbound application or from the network node itself, the PCE will transmit the configuration via PCEP message (Initiate or Response). Upon receipt, the source node in the path detects that QE is required by checking the explicit route object (ERO), and that the keyID is not yet set, extracting a valid key and keyID pair from the QKD system. The keyID is encapsulated and forwarded via RSVP to reach the destination node. The destination node finds the valid keyID (among other parameters), uses it to extract the key for the secure E2E channel. The workflow finalizes when the confirmation (RSVP Resv) arrives to the source node. The workflow is compatible with the generalized version of the protocol suite (GMPLS).

B. OpenFlow protocol

OpenFlow was designed as an enabler for SDN, allowing remote management of the forwarding plane using a controller. In that sense, OpenFlow differs from MPLS, as it was not defined for device to device communications. The workflow must change accordingly, as the key synchronization cannot happen directly between devices, and it should be orchestrated by the SDN controller. Fig. 4 shows the proposed workflow for OpenFlow. Initially and similarly to MPLS, the devices should expose the QE capabilities to the controller. Once this has been done, the controller can create the service, regardless of who initiated the request (packet in message from the device, static service/intent NBI request, etc.). The controller sends a flow with a new action specifying the parameters for the encryption. Within those parameters, the controller sends an unset keyID to be detected and modified by the device. When the device receives the flow, extracts the key and keyID pair from the QKD system, and saves the ID with the flow information that can be remotely accessed. The controller waits until the key is extracted and the flow is installed using a barrier request, retrieves the keyID from the device from the flow statistics, and sends the same flow to the destination node with an updated keyID. This process ends when the second (destination) node installs the flow.

C. NETCONF

NETCONF is a transactions-based protocol standardized by IETF which provides access to network device configuration.
The data transmitted using the NETCONF protocol is defined using a modelling language called YANG, and usually encapsulated into XML data structures. The workflow in this case is similar to the OpenFlow one (fig. 5), just differing in that it is not necessary to wait until the configuration has finished, as NETCONF is transaction-based, and any misconfiguration or error setting up the QE session (such as not available keys) will reverse the whole set of instructions. In this way, the controller will get the capabilities of the node from the hello message, and then will send an edit-config command to the device with an unset keyID. When the node finalizes its configuration, the controller sends a get-config message to retrieve the keyID set in the source node, sending a final edit-config to the destination node with the valid keyID. As the key extraction from the QKD system is part of the transaction, the source node will not respond to the edit-config until the key is obtained (or return an error if there are no available keys). When the response reaches the controller, it can gather the key ID via get-config.

The key difference between workflows resides mainly between MPLS and OpenFlow/NETCONF, as the actual deployment of the service (and, therefore, the key synchronization process) is forwarded differently: directly between the network nodes across the path or via network controller. OpenFlow and NETCONF just differ in the way the controller and devices communicate for the key synchronization (transaction-based SSH channel vs sequential OpenFlow commands synched via barrier request). After the service deployment, dynamic rekeying must be performed by the nodes. Updates over the control plane could cause overheads in the management network and the controller, which may be requested to handle hundreds or thousands of requests per second, depending on the number of services and the rekeying constraints of each of them. In this sense, nodes should synchronize between them for rekeying purposes, leaving service updates over the control plane for some specific situations (routing changes, issue with insufficient keys available, change on the service level agreements, etc.). The work shown in [20], which describes a protocol and method for synchronizing QKD keys in IPsec sessions, is a solution that could be integrated to support the dynamic rekeying after the service deployment operations.

V. Protocol Requirements

The workflows described in section III require various protocol extensions and information models to be defined. The proposed solutions will mainly focus on the mechanism for key synchronization and the transmission of the basic data used for the encrypted channel. Additionally, we will propose some extensions to include the new device capabilities into these protocols, to make the controller aware of which nodes do support these services. The main purpose of the dissemination is to expose the QE capabilities (for simplicity, as a single bit). Once this is done, adding further capabilities (e.g., supported algorithms, encryption layers, etc.) is easy, although they are out of the scope of this paper and left aside for simplicity.

A. MPLS Protocol suite

1) Device Capabilities: The MPLS protocol suite provides various solutions for exchanging topological information, depending on whether the information is shared internally (interior gateway protocol-IGP) or externally (border gateway protocol-BGP). Within the IGP, we have chosen the open-shortest path first (OSPF) protocol to include the QE capabilities, utilizing the extensions to advertise optional router capabilities defined in the RFC7770 [21]. The router informational capabilities TLV contains 4 bytes exposing the optional capabilities, where the bits 6-31 remain unassigned. The QE-enabled nodes will use the seventh bit to expose to other nodes and the PCE its new capability. When the OSPF message arrives, the PCE will store this capability in its traffic engineering database.

2) Key synchronization and service configuration: For initiating the deployment, the PCE has to receive a request that might come from different entities (the network device, a northbound user, network management system (NMS) or application, etc.). Independently of who initiated the request, a PCEP request containing the encryption requirements must be transmitted, as these requirements are encapsulated in new metric objects (used later by the PCE). The transmitted metrics in our case are: encryption layer, encryption algorithm, key length and refresh type and value. Upon receipt, the PCE will compute the required path, including the main parameters extracted from the metrics and an unset keyID inside a new QE Explicit Route Object (ERO) subobject (as explained in [5]). These new subobjects must be located after the nodes that are required to encrypt the traffic. The ERO is either returned as a response to whom requested the path, or as an initiate message to the source device in the path. The remaining part of the workflow does not require any additional extensions, apart from the manipulation done by the source node in order to inject the valid keyID. This insertion is done inside the QE ERO subobject placed after the destination device of the encrypted path.

B. OpenFlow Protocol

1) Device Capabilities: Similarly as in the MPLS scenario, it is intended to expose the QE capabilities in a basic
manner. For this purpose, we have included a single bit in the features reply message, the QE-capable bit (17th bit), within the capabilities field. As it will be explained below, the extension for the flow configuration will consist of a new action. Therefore, a new action could be added as well inside the feature reply if desired. Further capabilities (layer of encryption, algorithms, etc.) are left out of the scope, and could be added later as featured actions/capabilities or as new experimental messages. The SDN controller will identify, when this message is processed, which nodes are capable of performing a QE flow and proceed configuring the QE service/intent.

2) Key synchronization and service configuration: An OpenFlow rule is formed by a match/action pair (flow), used to identify and modify the incoming packets in accordance to the device’s internal flow table. When considering the possibility of encrypting specific incoming packets, the same tuple must be considered to identify (match) the traffic and apply the desired encryption to it (action). There is no need to modify or extend the matching process inside the device, as OpenFlow does support traffic matching for different layers. The main addition required consists of a new action specifying what to do (how to encrypt) with the incoming packets matched by the QE flow. Specifically, we have defined a new action (action type OFPAT13_QKD=0xFFFC), which contains the keyID, key length, the destination (IPv4), encryption layer and algorithms, and refresh type and value (if required) to be used by the device. When the device receives the FLOW_MOD OpenFlow message from the controller, it extracts a new key and keyID pair from the QKD system (if the keyID is unset), saving the valid keyID in the flow’s action field. The synchronization process is handled by the SDN controller and uses OpenFlow stats to retrieve the flow information (in this particular case, to retrieve the keyID), but it does not require additional extensions, as it includes the new action described for the FLOW_MOD operation.

C. NETCONF

1) Device Capabilities: Two devices interacting via NETCONF protocol, initiate their communications with a HELLO message. This message includes all the YANG models (also known as capabilities) supported by both ends. To enable the deployment of the QE service, we have created a new YANG model to configure the different parameters previously mentioned. When the hello message is transmitted, it includes a URL pointing the new YANG model to be used to encrypt an end-to-end communication using QKD keys. The NETCONF manager (controller), upon receipt, stores this capability on its database to be used when required by administrators or applications.

2) Key synchronization and service configuration: Due to the flexibility that YANG and NETCONF provide to create models for new capabilities and configurations, the required work is much simpler than in the other protocols. To achieve this goal, a new YANG model has been defined to include all the parameters required for the QE service. These parameters are, as previously mentioned: a keyID, key length, the destination (IPv4), encryption layer, algorithm, and a refresh type and value (if necessary). The NETCONF server (device) is the one in charge of retrieving and keeping the new QKD keys and their IDs, being (the IDs) gathered by the manager afterwards. No other extension is required, as the same model is used to configure (edit-config) and gather (get-config) the necessary information for the key synchronization.

VI. PLATFORM IMPLEMENTATION

To showcase the proposed scenario and extensions, we have created a tool (DockerNet) on top of the Docker container platform. This tool allows setting up virtual networks in different servers, based on containers and virtual switches. The containers deployed for this demonstration encapsulate different functionalities that are used to create the service and are connected in a distributed network, as shown in Fig. 6. The left part of the network includes a remote data center (DC) network providing database and web services, which are accessible through a virtual router. This virtual router forwards internal and external traffic (IP routes, tables and nating), allows to create IPsec sessions to external endpoints. It connects to the control plane using the protocols and extensions described in sections IV and V. It has also access to the QKD domain (Bob), as it is necessary to extract keys from the emulated QKD system used to encrypt the IPsec channel. This domain contains the network controller container (PCE, in the figure) as well, connected to both virtual routers using the service management network. The right part is analogous to the left. It includes another virtual router with the same capabilities as its left-side homologous, a QKD domain to provide keys (Alice) and a local private domain, with different hosts that can be accessed by end-users. Both networks are running inside two servers in Telefonica’s laboratory. The QKD domains are composed by IDQ containers (emulating IDQuantique Clavis2 systems) and ETSI proxy containers, providing an intermediate interface (based on [19]) between applications and the QKD domain.

The intermediate network comprises the physical infrastructure, connecting the data plane via carrier-grade IP and optical devices. The IP routers are two MX240 routers and the optical layer with four FSP3000 from ADVA. Both locations are connected via a L3 VPN service as it is done for the corporate services in Telefonica. Despite the QKD domain is emulated (with symmetric keys stored in Linux containers), the optical equipment used for this test has been previously demonstrated to be capable of supporting a quantum channel [12], [13]. The service management network is used for the control plane communications, while the main management network is used for controlling the virtualization tool (creating the virtual networks). Any control/management channel is not protected during these tests, but they could also support the hybrid security scheme proposed in [4]. Any intermediate (control or data) network is assumed to be pre-configured before the service deployment.

VII. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS

The implementation of the protocol extensions has been carried out in two different ways. Each protocol has been
Fig. 6. Logical scheme describing the network used for the end-to-end quantum encryption service via IPsec. The left part shows the DC management and data networks, with a QKD domain (Bob), and a virtual router connected to a PCE. The right part exposes the local network, connecting other virtual router to the remote PCE, and other QKD domain (Alice). The intermediate area exposes the packet/optical network.

Fig. 7. OpenFlow messages used for setting up a QE service demonstrated in different emulation scenarios, showcasing how the capabilities dissemination and the QKD key synchronization workflow work. Furthermore, the MPLS solution (based on Telefonica’s Netphony project [22]) has been also encapsulated inside a container and deployed via DockerNet, to demonstrate the integration of the proposed solution inside a virtual router. The virtual routers provide connectivity between two remote premises, giving access to remote web services and databases. They also encrypt the traffic between both endpoints, creating IPsec tunnels using QKD keys extracted from an emulated QKD link, all orchestrated from the control plane. It is important to note that any of the QKD networks described in section II (direct link or dark fiber, trusted-relay network, with or without classical and quantum coexistence [10]–[13]) is a valid solution compatible with our demonstration, as long as QKD keys are generated at both ends of the QE service and made available for the virtual routers to secure the traffic.

Fig. 7 presents the capture for the OpenFlow workflow, describing the necessary and extended messages to support the use case. It includes the features_reply message from the device (containing the new capability), flow_mod from the controller (with the new action), barrier request and response, and the final statistics gathered via multipart_reply. Fig. 8 (left) shows the QE capability inside the features_reply, advertised as a single bit, while the same figure (Fig. 8 right) exposes the new action and how the keyID (key_handle) is modified by the device. This ID changes from an unset value (0x00..00) to a valid ID, which is retrieved by the controller using the flow_stats. The retrieved ID will be consequently sent by the controller to the destination agent/device, which will take care of extracting the key from the emulated QKD system on its secure side.

The implementation for NETCONF has required the definition of a YANG model for the QE configuration. Fig. 9 shows the proposed YANG model, including the parameters shown in table 1. Despite the traffic capture for the NETCONF use case is not shown (as the NETCONF messages are encrypted via SSH), Fig. 10 shows the XML transmitted (edit-config) and received (get-config) from and by the NETCONF manager. It also shows the new capability exposed inside the hello message (Fig. 10, bottom).

Initially the manager sends the QE information, with the unset keyID. The NETCONF server (agent) receives this information, extracts the key and keyID pair from the QKD system, and stores the valid ID in the running data store. When the manager has finished transferring the configuration, it retrieves the keyID again from the devices using the get-config message. To finalize, the manager must transmit the valid keyID, together with the rest of parameters, to the destination
device of the QE service.

The last demonstration includes the deployment of the QE service utilizing the QKD keys for the encryption of an IPsec tunnel. Fig. 11 shows the messages exchanged between a PCE and both virtual routers across the service management network. The service request is initiated from the virtual router within the data center (point of presence) premises, sending a path computation request to the PCE with the required metrics (Fig. 12). The response from the PCE already includes the new QE ERO subobject used to synchronize the QKD keys and create the secure path. When the response reaches the source node, it extracts the key and keyID pair from the emulated QKD system (messages 3 and 4). The keyID is subsequently included in the RSVP path message, by changing the unset keyID within the ERO, as shown in Fig. 13. The configuration finalizes when the source node receives the RSVP RESV message back from the destination node.

Finally, Fig. 14 shows a traffic capture of one of the final services accessed using the deployed IPsec tunnel. This service is accessed from the local domain, going across the local virtual router, the intermediate network and the data center virtual router, reaching a database (Redis server). The capture

\begin{verbatim}
module qkd {
  namespace "http://www.ccs.ups.m/ces/qpdk_service";

  import leaf-inet-types {
    prefix inet;
  }

  import leaf-tall-common {
    prefix tall;
  }

  container enc_data {
    leaf callpoint qkd:
    leaf configured {
      type boolean;
    }
    container pk_enc {
      uses pk_info;
      leaf dest {
        type inet:ip-address;
        mandatory true;
        leaf refresh {
          type boolean;
        }
        container ref_config {
          uses ref_info;
          leaf ref_key {
            type uint8;
          } leaf ref_value {
            type uint32;
          } leaf refresh {
            type boolean;
          }
        } leaf-list key_handle {
          type uint64;
          ordered-by user;
        }
      } leaf enc_data {
        type uint64;
      } leaf enc_type {
        type uint8;
      } leaf enc_layer {
        type uint8;
      } leaf enc_algo {
        type uint8;
      }
    }
    container enc_info {
      leaf pk_info {
        type uint64;
      } leaf pk_key {
        type uint64;
      } leaf pk_key {
        type uint64;
      } leaf pk_key {
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      } leaf pk_key {
        type uint64;
      } leaf pk_key {
        type uint64;
      } leaf pk_key {
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      } leaf pk_key {
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        type uint64;
      } leaf pk_key {
        type uint64;
      } leaf pk_key {
        type uint64;
      } leaf pk_key {
        type uint64;
      }
    }
  }
}
\end{verbatim}

Fig. 9. YANG model for QE configuration

\[
\text{Fig. 10. NETCONF edit (left), get (right) config XML information and capabilities within a hello message.}
\]

\[
\text{Fig. 11. Set of MPLS and key extraction messages exchanged during the QE service deployment.}
\]

\[
\text{Fig. 12. Metrics sent inside the PCRequest message for the QE service.}
\]
was taken inside the data center domain. Messages (a) and (b) show the request, before and after passing through the virtual router. (c) and (d) show the response, opened before traversing the virtual router and encrypted afterwards.

VIII. CONCLUSION

QKD is a promising technology that brings an additional physical layer to secure current network infrastructures. This work proposes and demonstrates the required control plane workflows and protocol extensions for the integration of QKD keys into current network services. The key synchronization process (together with other encryption parameters) required for the subsequent encryption has been integrated in the major control plane protocols: MPLS, OpenFlow and NETCONF/YANG. We also demonstrate the ease with which these new systems can be integrated in novel network paradigms, by integrating the QKD-generated keys in IPsec sessions. This sessions are finally encapsulated inside VNFs automated via the aforementioned control plane extensions.

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